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12.1  Introduction 
It is widely recognized that the multilateral trading system embodied in the 
GATT has played an instrumental role in expanding world trade and supporting 
the phenomenal economic growth the world has experienced since World War 
11. Even a nonmember like Taiwan has benefited from access to increasingly 
open markets in industrial countries, particularly the United States. Immedi- 
ately after the war, as a hegemonic power, the United States championed multi- 
lateralism in world trade and led the way in successive multilateral negotiations 
for trade liberalization. This effort created international public goods on which 
even a nonmember like Taiwan can ride free. 
Since the  1970s, however, the United States has resorted with  increasing 
frequency to unilateral measures to solve trade problems. The 1974 US.  Trade 
Law provided the U.S. Trade Representative  (USTR) with a set of weaponry 
for practicing unilateralism, such as the Section 301 provision, and strength- 
ened safeguard measures. 
Armed with these weapons, the USTR undertook bilateral negotiations to 
achieve “orderly marketing arrangements,” such as voluntary export restraints 
and the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, to shield domestic U.S. industries from im- 
port  competition. Antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  cases  also became 
more commonplace, effectively deterring aggressive pricing strategies by im- 
porting countries. 
Unilateralism was heightened even further in the  1980s as the U.S.  trade 
deficit rose to an unprecedented level. Reciprocity and the “level playing field” 
became catchphrases of U.S. policymakers. In addition to measures restraining 
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imports, the USTR negotiated vigorously for access to foreign markets, with 
the targets being the former developing countries that had succeeded in indus- 
trializing. Bilateral talks on tariff concessions and other market access issues 
became regular tasks of the USTR. The enactment of the Super 301 and Spe- 
cial 301 provisions in the 1988 U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
brought unilateralism to a climax. 
It is generally believed that a bilateral approach to world trade problems is 
inferior to a multilateral approach. A bilateral approach may not even produce 
a second-best solution (Krueger 1993, 184).  The economic costs of VERs and 
the MFA have been well documented (see, e.g., Hufbauer, Berliner, and Elliot 
1986; de Melo and Tarr 1990; Cline 1990). The problems associated with safe- 
guard measures have also been widely discussed (see, e.g., Boltuck and Litan 
1991). In comparison, the bilateral approach to market opening has not been 
analyzed in great detail. Krueger’s (1993) exploration of the bilateral trade ne- 
gotiations between South Korea and the United States and Ito’s (1993) analysis 
of those between Japan and the United States are exceptions.  The basic conclu- 
sion of Krueger’s investigation is that forcing Korea to open its market under 
the threat of  the Super 301 provision not only represents a departure from 
GATT principles but also conflicts with the general U.S. policy goals toward 
developing countries. 
The purpose of  this paper is to examine bilateral trade arrangements be- 
tween the United States and Taiwan, one of its major trading partners targeted 
for market access in the 1980s.  Taiwan is similar to Korea in terms of its asym- 
metrical bargaining power vis-a-vis the United States. However, Taiwan may 
hold even fewer bargaining chips than Korea, making it more vulnerable to 
U.S. threats of trade sanctions. The United States generally prevailed through- 
out the bilateral negotiations. A study of  the Taiwan-US. case may  reveal 
whether the results of  bilateral negotiations dominated by  the United States 
conform to the multilateral principles espoused by  the United States. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In section 12.2, we examine the 
history of bilateral trade arrangements between Taiwan and the United States, 
focusing on export restrictions and market access issues other than tariff con- 
cessions. The cases in which Taiwan practices trade preference are identified 
and their background discussed. In section 12.3, we present a political econ- 
omy model to explain the results of Taiwan-U.S. bilateral negotiations on tariff 
concessions. It is found that, although the USTR may not consciously produce 
a list of demands for tariff concessions based on the political influence of do- 
mestic interest groups, the negotiation outcomes often reflect the lobbying 
power of  these groups. U.S. commitment to the multilateral system, mean- 
while, serves as an effective moral persuasion for Taiwan to follow a similar 
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12.2  Bilateral Trade Arrangements between Taiwan and the 
United States 
The United  States first engaged Taiwan in  a bilateral  trade agreement in 
1962, when Taiwan agreed to voluntarily restrict its exports of cotton textiles 
and apparel products to the United States. The agreement was negotiated under 
the auspices of the Long-Term Arrangement for Cotton Textiles, which is pri- 
marily an unilateral regulation instituted by the United States to curtail textile 
imports from Japan, Hong Kong, and Korea, as well as Taiwan. Despite this 
voluntary export restraint (VER) so agreed, Taiwan’s exports of textile products 
to the United States continued to increase rapidly, with man-made fiber prod- 
ucts accounting for most of the growth. The United States, in turn, pressured 
Taiwan, along with Japan, Hong Kong, and Korea, in 1971, to enter into new 
bilateral agreements aimed at limiting their exportation of woolen and man- 
made textile  and  apparel products.  These bilateral  actions initiated  by  the 
United States turned into the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) in 1974 under 
the purview of the GATT, allowing other members of the GATT to follow suit 
in setting geographical quotas to restrict trade in textile and apparel products. 
The agreement, which is an obvious violation of multilateralism, prevails to 
this day. 
The frequency with which the United States used VERs to contain trade 
flow increased substantially in the 1970s. The backdrop of this increased uni- 
lateralism was the promulgation of the 1974 Trade Law, which empowered the 
USTR (under Section 301) to retaliate against U.S. trade partners who engage 
in unfair trade practices. Fearful of trade sanctions, trade partners, particularly 
those depending asymmetrically on the U.S. market for export, usually suc- 
cumbed to U.S. pressure by  “voluntarily” restraining  those of  their exports 
deemed (by the United States) injurious to an orderly domestic U.S.  market. 
Taiwan agreed to a VER on nonrubber footwear in 1977 and a VER on color 
television sets in 1979. 
It has been shown theoretically and empirically that a VER may not hurt 
constrained exporters because it raises the price of the exported goods under 
the imperfect market  assumption (Feenstra 1984; Harris  1985; Ries  1993). 
There is also the possibility that the quality of the export products will shift 
upward in response to such a quantity restriction, resulting in an upgrading of 
the industry (Falvey 1979). A study by Aw  (1993) estimated the price increase 
of Taiwanese footwear during the VER-effective period of  1977-81  to be as 
high as 18 percent. A study by Aw  and Roberts (1986) also confirmed signifi- 
cant quality  improvement in Taiwanese footwear exports during the VER- 
effective period. 
It must be noted, however, that an abrupt restriction on the expansion of a 
booming industry just as it begins to show some prominence may undermine 
the incentive for further investment by existing firms in the industry and deter 
new entry. This may smother the industry before it has a chance to become 348  Tain-Jy Chen and Meng-chun Liu 
truly internationally competitive. Taiwan’s TV industry, which was subjected 
to a VER in 1979-82 and shrank quickly after the mid-l980s, might have been 
a victim of such a “bud-picking” policy. 
In analyzing the impact of U.S. VERs on Korean exports, Nam (1993) also 
expressed concern over the adverse effect of VERs on the long-term competi- 
tiveness of  the constrained industries. In addition to deferment of domestic 
investment, he also pointed out that allocation of export quotas may constitute 
an entry barrier that protects existing inefficient firms. 
U.S. unilateralism became even more aggressive in the 1980s as the United 
States suffered from increasing trade deficits and extensive unemployment at 
home. Under pressure from the National Machine Tool Builders Association, 
which pleaded for trade protection under Section 232 (safeguarding national 
security) of the Trade Expansion Act of  1962, the U.S.  government engaged 
Taiwan, along with Japan, in bilateral negotiations aimed at restricting Taiwan’s 
export of  machine tools to the U.S. market. The negotiations resulted in an- 
other VER agreement, which took effect in January 1987. The VER  on ma- 
chine tools was even more damaging to Taiwan’s industry than the VERs on 
textiles, footwear, and TV sets because the machine tool VER limited Taiwan’s 
market  share instead of  quantity or  growth rate. Market share restrictions 
placed on individual product categories based on previous market performance 
severely restrict an industry’s potential for upgrading from low-end to high- 
end products. Specifically, the VER accord on machine tools gave fairly sizable 
market shares to Taiwanese companies for conventional items, such as nonnu- 
merically controlled lathes (24.70 percent) and milling machines (19.29 per- 
cent), but very small market shares for advanced items with good growth po- 
tential,  such as  numerically controlled lathes  (3.23 percent) and  machine 
centers (4.66 percent). The VER, which was originally due to expire in January 
1992, was extended for another two years after a lengthy and friction-filled 
negotiation in  1992. Whether the VER has succeeded in protecting the U.S. 
machine tool industry is not clear. It is clear, however, that the VER has sup- 
pressed Taiwan’s market share along with Japan’s, allowing unrestricted com- 
petitors, notably Switzerland and Korea, to gain substantial market share dur- 
ing the restriction period. 
In addition to VERs, the United States has also resorted to safeguard mea- 
sures to restrict Taiwan’s exports into the U.S. market. Between 1980 and 1990, 
there were seven countervailing duty and 29 antidumping cases filed against 
Taiwan by U.S. industries, making Taiwan one of the top countries among all 
U.S.  trading partners blamed for the plight of  U.S. industry. For Taiwanese 
exporters, which are typically small in size, the lengthy and costly legal pro- 
cess involved in these cases presents an effective deterrent to price compe- 
tition.’ 
1. Compliance  with  an  investigation by  the U.S. authorities  in terms of  providing detailed 
operation-related data in computerized form is a real challenge to small exporters (Krueger 1993). 
Costs of  legal proceedings also often exceed the capacity of  small exporters. These firms usually 349  Bilateral Negotiations and Multilateral Trade 
The most aggressive series of  unilateral assaults launched by  the United 
States in the 1980s, however, were intended to pry open the doors of its trading 
partners for U.S. access to domestic markets. Many developing countries had 
thrived on exports to the open U.S. market theretofore and had developed siz- 
able domestic markets of  their own that could be reciprocally open to U.S. 
imports. Therefore, U.S. trade representatives pressured these countries to lib- 
eralize their domestic markets. Both Taiwan and Korea were selected as pri- 
mary targets. The United States used preferential tariffs afforded to Taiwanese 
and Korean exports under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) as the 
lever for bargaining. In fact, the negotiations undertaken were often called 
“GSP consultations,” although the agenda were largely focused on market 
opening. Ironically, despite continuous concessions by Taiwan and Korea, GSP 
preferences for these two countries were appealed in January 1989. Later, the 
U.S. trade representatives switched to the Super 301 and Special 301 provis- 
ions of the 1988 Trade Act as the main levers for bilateral bargaining. 
U.S. pressure for access to Taiwan’s market was heightened in the second 
half of the 1980s when the bilateral trade imbalance swelled to a historic level. 
Because the impulse of import liberalization often intruded into the domain of 
politically powerful domestic interest groups, trade friction became inevitable. 
As documented in table 12.1, between 1986 and 1988 there were at least four 
occasions on which Taiwan was on the brink of being subject to unilateral trade 
sanctions by the U.S. 
In May  1986, Taiwan was investigated by the USTR under the provisions of 
Section 307 of the 1974 Trade Law for its imposition of an export performance 
requirement on an investment project in Taiwan proposed by the Japanese auto- 
maker Toyota. According to this performance requirement, Toyota was to ex- 
port no less than 30 percent of the cars assembled in Taiwan in the initial pe- 
riod, and the export ratio was to exceed 50 percent when production reached 
full capacity. Fearing that Toyota would “dump” these cars on the U.S. market, 
the USTR demanded that Taiwan remove the export performance requirement 
and invoked the Section 307 investigation to stage a credible threat. Taiwan 
succumbed to the pressure by removing the export performance requirement; 
but the action also killed the investment project because existing carmakers in 
Taiwan  lobbied against the Toyota project for fear of  being outcompeted if 
Toyota were allowed to sell freely in the domestic market.2 
The United States also invoked Section 301 investigations twice in  1986, 
the year that Taiwan’s bilateral trade surplus with the United States reached a 
historic high of $13.6 billion. In August 1986, the first Section 301 investiga- 
tion was undertaken after Taiwan refused to revamp its practice of  assessing 
exit the U.S.  market altogether when an affirmative decision is reached at the preliminary determi- 
nation stage. They cannot afford the risk of an uncertain dumping margin that may eventually be 
imposed on them in final determination. 
2. Toyota later made a smaller-scale investment in 1989 with no export performance commit- 
ment. The cars assembled under the project were all sold domestically. 350  Tain-Jy Chen and Meng-chun Liu 
Table 12.1  Major Unilateral Actions Taken by the United States against Taiwan, 
1986-93 
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Source: Compiled from Baldwin, Chen, and Nelson (1995) 
customs duties on imported goods based on an official price table. Facing im- 
minent Section 301 retaliation, Taiwan abolished the official price table and 
began assessing customs duties based on the transaction value. 
The first serious trade dispute concerning market access also arose in 1986, 
when Taiwan and the United States could not agree on the tariff levels to be 
imposed in Taiwan on U.S. cigarettes and the regulations concerning cigarette 
advertisement in Taiwan. Just one year earlier, Taiwan had reluctantly agreed 
to allow U.S. cigarettes, beer, and wine to be imported freely. The dispute on 
tariffs and advertising led the USTR to invoke Section 301 investigation for 
the second time in 1986. The action forced Taiwan to lower the tariff level, 351  Bilateral Negotiations and Multilateral Trade 
although Taiwan’s regulations on cigarette advertisement were enacted largely 
unchanged. 
Another serious dispute concerning market access arose in 1988, when Tai- 
wan refused to remove an import quota on U.S. turkey meat. Strong protests 
against imported turkey meat were voiced by Taiwan’s chicken farmers, who 
demonstrated in front of  the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto U.S. 
embassy in Taipei, and who later staged a street rally that turned into a riot. 
Despite the strong resistance from local farmers, the Taiwanese government 
agreed to dismantle the import quota after being investigated under the Section 
301 provision. 
After the enactment of  the  1988 U.S.  Trade Law,  which empowered the 
USTR with the Special 30 1 provision, bilateral negotiations between Taiwan 
and the United States focused on the issue of intellectual property rights. The 
USTR has placed Taiwan on the Priority Watch list under the Special 301 pro- 
vision three times since the law took effect (see table 12.1). Once placed on 
the Priority Watch list, Taiwan had to negotiate with the USTR for a settlement 
that  would  significantly improve the protection  of  U.S.-owned  intellectual 
property within six months or face sanctions. Under this pressure, Taiwan re- 
vised its copyright law twice to meet U.S. demands, with some provisions now 
exceeding international  standards in copyright protection. For  example, the 
current version of the copyright law in Taiwan prohibits Taiwanese citizens 
from importing original works through unauthorized  dealers or from third- 
party markets (i.e., parallel imports). 
Nevertheless,  confrontation  was  the  exception  rather  than  the  norm  in 
Taiwan-U.S.  negotiation^.^ Often, Taiwan succumbed to U.S. pressure without 
much resistance, particularly when the domestic interest groups at stake lacked 
political clout. In cases where the domestic interest groups to be affected were 
politically  sensitive, such as agriculture, or politically powerful, such as the 
insurance and security industries, Taiwan often resorted to trade preference to 
reduce the impact on domestic industries. As in the case of Japan, U.S. pressure 
is sometimes useful in helping dismantle vested interest groups at minimum 
political cost (Ito 1993), but the practice of trade preference incurs extra costs 
on resource all~cation.~  Trade preference often takes the form of offering ex- 
clusive market access to American firms. Since Taiwan was not a member of 
the GATT, it was free to exercise discrimination, although this practice some- 
times brought protests from other trading partners, such as the European coun- 
3. Li (1994) argued that confrontation is likely to arise when preference distribution on both 
sides is homogeneous and when societal pressure is great. A homogeneous preference distribution 
(lack of opposition) and societal pressure (strong lobbying) eliminate room for compromise. He 
categorized the issues of agriculture and intellectual property rights in Taiwan-U.S. talks as being 
in this class. 
4.  Ito (1993) argued that in the case of Japan, businesses that lost vested interests under U.S. 
pressure were those that sided with Japan’s ruling party (LDP) and the United States in ideology. 
The situation is similar in Taiwan, where the losers are big private firms politically tied to the 
ruling party (KMT) and enterprises that are owned outright by the state and the ruling party. 352  Tain-Jy Chen and Meng-chun Liu 
Table 12.2  Preferential Treatment of U.S. Imports to Taiwan 
Import Items  Preference 
Fresh peaches and persimmons  Exclusive market access 
Tobacco, beer, and wine  Exclusive right to distribute in Taiwan 
Turkey meat  Exclusive market access 
Beef  U.S. beef classified as “prime” or “choice” by U.S. standards 
Wheat, maize, and soybeans  Favored by Taiwan’s import cartels under government 
Insurance  U.S. insurance firms are given exclusive rights to establish 
is subject to lower tariffs 
direction 
branches in Taiwan 
Securities 
Automobiles 
US. brokerage firms are favored in license granting 
Imports are allowed for vehicles made in North America and 
Western Europe only 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
tries. On such occasions, Taiwan would engage the complainant in a bilateral 
negotiation for a settlement. Since no other trading partner possessed the asym- 
metrical bargaining power that the United States did, bilateral negotiations 
with non-U.S. trading partners were not as lopsided. 
For the U.S. trade negotiators, who still proclaimed themselves the champi- 
ons of  multilateralism, Taiwan’s offer of unilateral trade preference put them 
in a dilemma. They could accept the offer for the benefit of American indus- 
tries but at the expense of multilateralism, or they could reject the offer in favor 
of continued negotiations that were costly and whose results were uncertain. 
A simple rule seemed to guide the decisions of U.S. negotiators; that is, accept 
the offer when the beneficiary industries in the United States were concen- 
trated or politically sensitive, and reject the offer when the domestic interests 
were diversified or the benefits from access to Taiwan’s market were hard to ap- 
propriate. 
Table 12.2 lists some major trade preferences that Taiwan has granted to the 
United States, most of which still prevail today. Among them, four are related 
to agricultural products, including fruit, turkey meat, beef, and grain. The oth- 
ers are related to tobacco, beer, and wine, automobiles, and the insurance and 
securities industries. Exclusive market access is granted to U.S. fresh peaches 
and persimmons, turkey meat, and insurance operators. U.S. tobacco, beer, and 
wine are allowed to be imported and distributed through agents designated by 
the manufacturers, whereas other brands can only be imported by  the state- 
owned monopoly  producer  in  Taiwan.  U.S. beef  classified  as  “prime” or 
“choice” by U.S. standards is subject to a lower tariff rate, whereas its main 
competitor, Australian beef, has been subject to a higher tariff rate that applies 
to low-grade beef. Importation of beef from other origins, such as Argentina, 
is prohibited for physiological and sanitary reasons. U.S. wheat, maize, and 
soybeans, meanwhile, benefit from a subtle preference scheme in which the 353  Bilateral Negotiations and Multilateral Trade 
Taiwanese government has created import cartels for the respective grains and 
directed these monopsonies to buy from the United States. At times, the “Buy 
American” missions organized by these import cartels have even been manipu- 
lated to favor particular states of the United States. In the case of the securities 
industry, the Taiwanese government has exercised favoritism in granting bro- 
kerage licenses to U.S. brokerage firms. 
These trade preferences have been effective in tilting economic benefits in 
favor of U.S. firms. For years, U.S. grain has accounted for more than 90 per- 
cent of Taiwan’s grain imports. Taiwan is the largest export market for Ameri- 
can automobiles in Asia, and there are more U.S.-based insurance operators in 
Taiwan than indigenous ones. 
Trade preferences, however, have also incurred apparent economic costs via 
trade diversion effects. For example, suppression of cigarette imports from Ja- 
pan has resulted in widespread smuggling of  Japanese brands such as Mild 
Seven. Exclusive market access for automobiles made in North America and 
Europe has resulted in large numbers of Toyota, Honda, and other Japanese 
makes being imported from the United States rather than from Japan. The 
locking-out of  European insurance firms has  resulted in insurance policies 
written by Hong Kong branches of European firms being sold in Taiwan’s un- 
derground market, causing legal problems. 
In contrast with the issues in which relevant domestic U.S. interests are con- 
centrated, the United States has usually insisted on multilateralism on the is- 
sues in which U.S. economic interests are dispersed. For example, U.S. negoti- 
ators repeatedly turned down Taiwan’s  offer to enhance protection of  U.S. 
trademarks, patents, and copyrights on an exclusive basis. 
In fact, in areas where Taiwan’s domestic market is dominated by large con- 
glomerates and state-owned enterprises, whose political influence is formida- 
ble, the Taiwanese government seems to prefer bilateral agreements with the 
United States to allow exclusive access to American firms (hence partial liber- 
alization) rather than full-scale liberalization under the multilateral prin~iple.~ 
At one point, Taiwan even proposed the formation of a free trade area with the 
United States to put all bilateral disputes to rest. The proposal was rejected, 
however. 
12.3  The Political Economy of Tariff Concessions 
In addition to bilateral arrangements for constraining Taiwanese exports to 
the United States and for opening Taiwan’s market to U.S. exports, the United 
States also engaged Taiwan in negotiations for lowering Taiwanese tariffs on 
imports. Tariff  negotiations are completely consonant with the multilateral 
5. Granting exclusive market access to American firms may also forge partnerships between 
those American producers and Taiwan’s state- and party-owned enterprises, carrying political im- 
plications. 354  Tain-Jy Chen and Meng-chun Liu 
Table 12.3  Number of Tariff Concessions Requested by the United States and 
Granted by Taiwan, 1978-89 































Note: Classification is based on Customs Import Tariff of  the Republic of China (CTRN) code 
except for 1989, which is based on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systcm 
(HS Code). Numbers are counted at the eight-digit level. 
principle as all concessions made by Taiwan are extended to all trading partners 
on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis. The United States first engaged Taiwan 
in bilateral trade talks in 1978, aiming at obtaining concessions from Taiwan 
in exchange for U.S. extension to Taiwan of concessions it committed itself to 
in the Tokyo Round. In other words, the United States used bilateral negotia- 
tion to incorporate Taiwan, a nonsignatory of the GATT, into the multilateral 
system. The talks covered both tariff and nontariff trade issues. From  1978 
until  1989, Taiwan and the United States engaged in tariff negotiations nine 
times. The negotiations then were recessed when Taiwan declared its intention 
to apply for GATT membership and filed an official application in 1990. Since 
bilateral negotiations following Taiwan’s GATT application would have had 
important implications for the GATT admitting procedure, the United States 
wisely halted the annual trade talks at that point.6 
The purpose of this section of the paper is to examine the pattern of Taiwan’s 
tariff concessions. From this examination we hope to uncover the political eco- 
nomic explanations €or U.S.  demands for tariff reductions and Taiwan’s re- 
sponses. 
Table 12.3 lists the tariff concessions requested by  the United States and 
eventually granted by Taiwan in these nine rounds of negotiations. It can be 
seen that a total of 1,807 tariff reductions were requested by the United States, 
6. As admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) needs to be unanimously approved by 
WTO members, the United States took the opportunity to produce a lengthy list of  demands for 
liberalization and policy changes.  The package was aimed at removing all remaining trade impedi- 
ments in Taiwan. In previous negotiations, which were termed “informal consultations,” US.  ne- 
gotiators had addressed the issues in a piecemeal and incremental manner, whereby a partial con- 
cession by Taiwan might be accepted with the expectation that further progress could be made in 
future negotiations. The negotiation pertinent to WTO admission was a one-shot deal, and the 
incrementalism principle was abandoned. 355  Bilateral Negotiations and Multilateral Trade 
Table 12.4  Sectoral Distribution of Tariff Concessions by Taiwan, 1978-88 
Number of  Number of Tariff  Total Number of 
Concessionsb  Items Affected  Tariff Items  BIC 
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Total  1,388  942  4,577  20.6 
'Classification is based on Customs Import Tariff of the Republic of China (CTRN) code, at the 
eight-digit level. Some CTRN codes appear in more than one sector, making the total number of 
concessions in this table greater than the total number of granted concessions shown in table 12.3. 
bNumber of  concessions  is  greater  than  tariff items  affected  because  some concessions  were 
made repetitively. 
'Fabricated metal includes machinery, electronics, and transport equipment. 
some repetitively  on the same items, and a total of  1,314 concessions were 
actually granted. The success rate was 72.7 percent, although the amount by 
which the duty was actually reduced on each item might be smaller than the 
original demand. In addition to tariff concessions so granted, Taiwan also cut 
tariffs on its own initiative in order to bring the tariff structure in line with its 
own objectives, for example, to provide adequate effective rates of protection 
to strategic industries. As a result, the Taiwanese government rewrote the tariff 
law almost every year to bring the tariff schedule up to date. Successive conces- 
sions brought the average tariff burden down from 11.3 percent in 1978 to 6.3 
percent in 1989.' 
The requesting and granting of concessions were not made randomly, they 
were based on political economic calculations. Table 12.4 lists the distribution 
of concessions across industries. It can be seen that in terms of the sheer num- 
ber  of  concessions, the fabricated metal  industry (encompassing machinery, 
electronics, and transport equipment) had the largest number, at 333, followed 
by 291 in the food-processing industry, and 224 in the chemical industry. It can 
also be seen from column (B) of the table that the number of  tariff items af- 
fected was smaller than the number of concessions, indicating that some tariffs 
were cut repetitively. The last column of the table indicates the proportion of 
tariff items subject to tariff cut. It can be seen that during the 11-year negotia- 
7. Average tariff burden is derived by dividing tariff revenue by value of total imports. 356  Tain-Jy Chen and Meng-chun Liu 
tions, 20.6 percent of all tariff items were negotiated to come down at least 
once. The efforts of U.S. trade representatives toward reducing Taiwan’s trade 
barriers have to be admired. Among the broadly defined industry categories, 
the food-processing industry witnessed the highest proportion of  tariff items 
targeted for tariff reduction (38.9 percent). This was followed by the wood and 
paper industry (31.7 percent) and the fabricated metal industry (28.0 percent). 
A large proportion of agricultural products (24.2 percent) were also earmarked 
for tariff cut, in addition to being frequent targets of negotiations for removal 
of nontariff trade barriers. 
We  conducted a statistical test to see whether these tariff concessions were 
deliberately selected or randomly chosen. Comparing the frequency distribu- 
tion of actual tariff concessions made across industries with the frequency dis- 
tribution of the tariff population across industries, we obtained a chi-squared 
statistic of 266.6 under the null hypothesis that the two distributions are indis- 
tinguishable. Given that there are nine degrees of freedom, the statistic soundly 
rejects the null hypothesis, implying that the concessions were not made ran- 
domly. 
Presumably, U.S. trade negotiators chose items in which US.  producers pos- 
sessed a comparative edge in Taiwan’s market. And, in fact, for the import items 
targeted by the United States for concessions and actually acted upon by Tai- 
wan  in the nine rounds of negotiations, the United States occupied a market 
share of 31.6 percent in  1977, one year before the negotiations commenced, 
compared to its 23.1 percent market share in Taiwan’s overall import market 
that same year. In 1990, one year after the last round of negotiations, the U.S. 
market share among these conceded import items rose to 45.0 percent, whereas 
the U.S. share in Taiwan’s total imports was 23.0 percent, virtually unchanged 
from the 1977 level. It is apparent that the import items targeted for negotiation 
and ultimately subjected to concession were those for which comparative ad- 
vantage was moving in favor of U.S. producers or whose market potential in 
Taiwan was better for American products than the average. Therefore, although 
the United States created public goods by  negotiating with Taiwan for tariff 
reduction, there was an intrinsic bias in the scope of reduction driven by U.S. 
self-interest. In the following, we will explore the interplay of this self-interest 
and Taiwan’s defense strategy. 
We  envisage a political economy model in  which interest groups in the 
United States motivate U.S. negotiators’ demands for specific tariff conces- 
sions. Taiwanese negotiators, on the other hand, react to these demands by 
deciding whether to concede based on political and economic costs at home. 
Until the later part of the 1980s, Taiwan had a basically autocratic government 
with limited influence from business interests. While maintaining a harmoni- 
ous relationship with the United States was a predominant policy concern, the 
Taiwanese government’s decision rule at this time would probably have been 
to act so as to minimize adverse effects on economic development with little 
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little relevance in bilateral negotiations, although it might have been used to 
legitimize the negotiators’  positions. For example, before the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, there were no unified rules on 
agricultural  trade.  Taiwanese negotiators  cited  the  widespread  practices  of 
GATT members in protecting their domestic agricultural products to justify 
Taiwan’s high tariffs on agricultural products. 
Based on the political economy model of trade policy formation expounded 
by Baldwin (1989) and Olson (1969, and considerations of bargaining strat- 
egy, we attempted to determine which factors were important in influencing 
the selection of  tariff items that were targeted for negotiation  by the United 
States and that were conceded by Taiwan. This was done with  a regression 
model. We include the following variables in analyzing the determination of 
tariff concessions in bilateral talks. The explanatory variables are divided into 
two groups, one related to Taiwan and the other related to the United States. 
Taiwan-Related Variables 
Public Enterprise (PUB).  Public enterprises are a crucial factor in the determi- 
nation of Taiwan’s structure of trade protection. A sector in which public enter- 
prises have a larger output share is also more heedfully protected by tariff and 
nontariff measures (Chen and Hou 1993). Taiwanese government officials are 
likely to be more determined in defending the interests of  public enterprises 
than private  enterprises because the demise of  public enterprises means de- 
creasing governmental control over economic resources for political  expedi- 
ency. Their US.  counterparts, who understand the importance of Taiwan’s pub- 
lic enterprises, may also refrain from attacking sectors pertinent to the interests 
of public enterprises to avoid acrimony. The variable PUB is measured by the 
share of public enterprises in the output of each sector. 
Employment (EMP).  In a democratic society, employment means voting power. 
Most studies suggest that the larger the employment size of the industry, the 
higher the expected level of protection (Baldwin 1989, 122). Taiwan, however, 
in the period that we studied here, was not yet a mature democratic society. To 
what extent employment mattered to policymakers and influenced negotiators 
is an empirical question. EMP is measured by the number of workers in each 
sector. 
Wages (WAGE).  Wage rate may be an important factor in trade negotiations for 
two reasons. First, public officials may  seek to protect workers whose wages 
are already relatively low from market pressures resulting from liberal trade 
policies out of egalitarian concerns (Baldwin  1989, 122). Second, wages are 
generally positively correlated with skills embodied in workers. As has been 
demonstrated in the trade literature, worker skills are important determinants 
of the comparative advantage of industrialized countries (Keesing 1966; Bald- 
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be an industry in which Taiwan was gaining comparative advantage, as the 
country was making the transition from a labor-abundant to a labor-shortage 
economy during the period studied. If Taiwan’s officials are concerned about 
protecting newly emerging industries more than declining industries, they may 
be more determined to resist trade liberalization in high-wage sectors. WAGE 
is measured  by monthly  wage per worker, in terms of NT (Taiwanese cur- 
rency). 
TariffLevel (TB).  U.S.  negotiators are likely to target Taiwan’s high-tariff items 
for tariff cut. This makes economic sense because the potential benefit from 
trade creation is high. For example, US. negotiators successfully forced Tai- 
wan to reduce the tariff on imported automobiles from 50 percent to 30 per- 
cent, creating a buoyant market for imported cars. It also makes sense in terms 
of  bargaining  strategy because  the rule  of  proportionate  tariff  concessions 
agreed upon by industrial countries in the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations 
provides a “moral” ground for demanding that high tariffs be cut first. 
NontariffBarriers (NTB).  Nontariff barriers may be used as substitutes or com- 
plements for tariffs as measures of trade protection. In Taiwan’s case, the two 
are shown to be substitutes (Chen and Liu 1993). The major nontariff barriers 
in Taiwan are licensing requirements, which tend to be more stringent for sec- 
tors in which tariff levels are lower. During the bilateral negotiations that we 
studied, licensing control was also a major issue on the negotiation  agenda. 
Through the years of negotiation, licensing control was significantly lessened 
along with the reduction of tariffs. U.S. negotiators tended to treat tariff and 
nontariff barriers as strategic complements and attacked them at the same time. 
NTB is measured by a weighted index of  various non-tariff  trade protection 
measures as described in the appendix. 
In addition, the four-firm concentration ratio of Taiwanese industry was tried 
as an explanatory variable in the regression but was dropped for lack of  sig- 
nificance. 
US.-Related Variables 
Changes  in  US. Tariff Level  resulting from  the  Tokyo Round Agreements 
(UTB). U.S. engagement  with Taiwan in bilateral  negotiations was initially 
aimed at integrating Taiwan into the Tokyo Round agreements. Therefore, the 
concessions that the United States made in the Tokyo Round might be used as 
the yardstick  for negotiations or the basis for reciprocity. The United States 
might ask Taiwan to make a similar pattern of concessions to make the bilateral 
talks conform with multilateral agreements. UTB is measured by the percent- 
age change in the nominal U.S. tariff rate as described in the appendix. 
Changes in U.S. Effective Rate of Protection resulting @om the Tokyo Round 
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direction from the nominal tariff rate. Concessions in nominal tariffs are usu- 
ally used to gauge the degree of trade liberalization, but the real indicator of 
government trade policy may be the effective rate of protection. The change in 
effective rate of  protection may  truly reflect the U.S. government’s concerns 
for domestic industry. It will be interesting to see whether the U.S. government 
sought to expand export markets through bilateral efforts to aid industries that 
were losing or gaining in effective rate of protection at home. UERP is also 
measured in percentage. 
Industry Concentration (UCR4). It is well documented in the political econ- 
omy literature that industrial concentration is conducive to lobbying power and 
hence trade protection. Through bilateral negotiations on nontariff issues, we 
have witnessed the formidable political forces of the U.S. industries dominated 
by oligopolies, such as tobacco, automobiles, insurance, banking, and finance. 
We expect this influence to carry over to tariff negotiations. UCR4 is measured 
by four-firm concentration ratio of U.S. industry in 1987. 
Revealed Comparative Advantage  (URCA).  Aggregated data presented above 
suggest that the United States gained substantial market share in the sectors in 
which tariffs were reduced as a result of bilateral negotiations. We hypothesize 
that US. negotiators chose the sectors targeted for tariff cuts in line with the 
comparative advantage of various U.S. industries. The index of revealed com- 
parative advantage proposed by Balassa (1977) is used to measure the competi- 
tiveness of U.S. products in Taiwanese markets. This index is included in the 
regression analysis to see whether it exerts a systematic impact on the pattern 
of tariff concessions. 
We  employ the above two sets of variables in a regression analysis to see to 
what extent each variable can help to explain the likelihood of each Taiwanese 
industrial sector’s being targeted by  the United States for tariff cuts and the 
likelihood of its being actually subject to a cut. Industrial sectors are defined 
at the three-digit level in Taiwan’s official industrial classification (CIC). For 
our purposes here, all import and export commodities listed in the official tariff 
schedules (at the eight-digit level) are first classified into their proper industry 
sector and then the proportion of  those commodity items subjected to tariff 
cuts or to demands for tariff cuts in each round of negotiation is taken as the 
dependent variable. Since the dependent variable lies between zero and one, 
we adopt a limited dependent variable model to conduct the regression analy- 
sis. The results are reported in table 12.5. 
We  conducted regressions on two equations separately. The first is the US. 
demand equation, in which the dependent variable measures the proportion of 
tariff concessions requested by U.S. negotiators at the beginning of the round. 
Data on initial US. requests are available for the last five rounds of negotia- 
tions only (1986-89).  The second equation is the final concessions equation, 360  Tain-Jy Chen and Meng-chun Liu 
Table 12.5  Limited Dependent Variable Model for Tariff Concessions 
Coefficient Estimates 
Explanatory  U.S. Demand for  Final Concessions, 
Variable  Concessions, 1986-89  1978-89 
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Notes: Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t-statistics. 
*Asymptotically significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Asymptotically significant at the 5 percent level. 
in which the dependent variable measures the proportion of tariff concessions 
finally made by the Taiwanese government at the end of negotiations. Data on 
final concessions are complete for all nine rounds. 
It can be seen from table 12.5 that the set of independent variables exhibits 
different explanatory power in the two equations. For the U.S. demand equa- 
tion, five independent variables, namely, Taiwan’s public enterprises (PUB), 
Taiwan’s wage rate (WAGE), Taiwan’s tariff level (TB), Taiwan’s nontariff barri- 
ers (NTB), and the revealed comparative advantage of US.  industry (URCA), 
are shown to be asymptotically significant. The United States tends to refrain 
from demanding tariff concessions in sectors dominated by public enterprises 
in Taiwan and in sectors in which wages are relatively low in Taiwan. “Respect- 
ing” Taiwan’s public enterprises and the roles pursued by them was the gesture 
shown by U.S. trade representatives in the negotiations on nontariff barriers. 
For example, in the negotiation on market access for U.S. tobacco, U.S. trade 
representatives never disputed Taiwan’s system of monopolizing tobacco pro- 
duction by  the state. U.S.  negotiators also never challenged Taiwan’s  state- 361  Bilateral Negotiations and Multilateral Trade 
owned oil monopoly. Part of the reason may lie with the favoritism these public 
enterprises often exercised in the procurement of American products. This atti- 
tude may be extended to tariff negotiations. 
The fact that the United States also refrains from pressuring Taiwan’s low- 
wage sectors for trade liberalization can hardly be conceived of as due to a 
“social concern” for Taiwan’s poor workers. It is more conceivable that low- 
wage sectors are also declining sectors in which the United States sees little 
prospect for importing American products. High-wage sectors are targeted be- 
cause their potential for sales of US. products is good. 
The U.S.  assault  on high-tariff  sectors came as no surprise.  The United 
States also campaigned more vigorously for tariff concessions in sectors where 
nontariff barriers are high. Since many nontariff barriers also provide Taiwan- 
ese trade administrators with discretionary power to practice trade preference 
to the advantage of U.S. exporters, the benefits of tariff cuts in this area are 
likely to be  captured by  U.S. producers. This may explain why  the United 
States  treats  tariff  and  nontariff  barriers  as  strategic  complements  in bar- 
gaining. 
It is reassuring that the index of revealed comparative advantage is signifi- 
cantly and positively correlated with U.S. demands for tariff reduction. This 
suggests that U.S. negotiators target U.S. products that have been selling well 
in Taiwan and a tariff reduction may bring disproportionately large benefits to 
U.S. producers. 
It is interesting to note that the two variables related to the Tokyo Round 
agreements, changes in U.S. nominal tariff (UTB) and effective rate of protec- 
tion (UERP), are not significant factors in shaping U.S. demands for conces- 
sions. The degree of industry concentration (UCR4) also turns out to be insig- 
nificant. In other words, U.S. negotiators compile the list of commodities for 
tariff negotiations mainly based on U.S. comparative advantage, with little re- 
gard to the lobbying  power of  the  industry or to U.S.  commitments  in the 
Tokyo Round negotiations. 
The determinants of the final concessions, supposedly a result of the tug-of- 
war between U.S. pressure and Taiwanese counterpressure, present a different 
picture. A U.S. request for a tariff  concession will be granted only if U.S. 
pressure is high and counterpressure from Taiwan against such liberalization 
is  low.  In  other words,  nonpriority  items  on the U.S.  demand  list may  be 
dropped if they are in strong conflict with Taiwan’s interests. On the other hand, 
nonpriority items from Taiwan’s perspective may be “sacrificed” to salvage the 
priority items. 
Table 12.5 shows that in the final concessions equation, public enterprises 
(PUB) remain significant and negatively related to the probability of tariff con- 
cession.  This  suggests  that  both  sides  share  an  interest  in  sparing  state- 
dominated sectors from tariff concessions. Taiwan’s wages (WAGE), however, 
exert a negative impact on the proportion of tariff reduction, contrary to its 
correlation with U.S. demands. The Taiwanese government seems to be deter- 362  Tain-Jy Chen and Meng-chun Liu 
mined to withstand U.S. pressure to open up markets in high-wage sectors and 
appears to be successful in doing so. The complete reversal of the pattern of 
trade liberalization for these sectors is something remarkable, reflecting  the 
strategic importance of Taiwan’s high-wage, and probably  also high-skilled, 
sectors. Although export promotion is the major Taiwanese government policy 
toward developing strategic industries in Taiwan, protecting these industries 
from premature exposure to import competition is also considered important. 
In this regard, we can sense the importance of industrial development concerns 
on the part of Taiwan in trade negotiations. In fact, Taiwan’s Bureau of Indus- 
trial Development, which is in charge of industrial policy, played a pivotal role 
in each round of negotiations. 
Existing tariff and nontariff barriers in Taiwan, which are important determi- 
nants of U.S. demands for tariff cuts, are not as important in determining the 
final outcome of negotiations. The commodities that end up on the final list for 
tariff reduction are not necessarily high-tariff  items. In fact, our analysis re- 
veals that a higher level of tariff  on a given item does not even increase the 
likelihood of that item’s being actually selected for tariff slicing, as the variable 
TB is not asymptotically significant. The variable for nontariff barriers (NTB), 
however, remains significant at the 10 percent level, although its statistical con- 
tribution to the likelihood of being finally selected for tariff cut is much smaller 
than its effect on the likelihood of being targeted by U.S. negotiators, judging 
by the  much  smaller coefficient estimate  for NTB  in  the  final concessions 
equation. 
Interestingly, tariff concessions agreed to by the United States in the Tokyo 
Round and the resulting changes in the effective rate of protection turn out to 
be important determinants of the final pattern of tariff concessions agreed to 
by Taiwan, although they do not significantly influence US. negotiators’  list 
of requests. The variable of changes in U.S. nominal tariffs (UTB) is shown to 
be negatively related to likelihood of tariff concession, meaning that for indus- 
tries in which the United States made more drastic cuts in tariffs, Taiwan also 
agreed to more cuts. In other words, U.S. commitments in the multilateral sys- 
tem seem to carry some power to persuade Taiwan to pledge a similar pattern 
of concessions. Perhaps Taiwan does not want to be seen as a free rider on the 
multilateral system. On the other hand, the final concessions made by Taiwan 
are positively related to changes in the effective rate of protection in U.S. in- 
dustry (UERP). This implies that sectors that gain in effective rate of protec- 
tion in the United States are also more likely to gain from easier access to the 
Taiwanese market. This is an apparent “strategic” trade policy aimed at boost- 
ing priority industries. 
It is also noticeable that the four-firm concentration ratio (UCR4), which is 
an unimportant factor in U.S. demands for tariff concessions, turns out to be 
important in deciding the final outcome of negotiations. This implies that con- 
centrated industries flex their muscle through their lobbying power in the bar- 
gaining process, making their demands hard for Taiwanese negotiators to resist 
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The revealed  comparative advantage (URCA) of U.S. industry remains a 
significant factor in determining the final outcome of bilateral bargaining, al- 
though its importance is reduced, judging from a smaller coefficient estimate 
in the final concessions equation. Resistance by Taiwan’s negotiators seems to 
have attenuated its strength. 
The only variable that turns out to be insignificant in both equations is em- 
ployment (EMP). It has a correct, negative sign in the final concessions equa- 
tion, suggesting that Taiwan’s negotiators are somewhat concerned about the 
“voice” of industries with large numbers of employees. This concern has not 
been transformed into a significant factor for trade negotiators in a new-born 
democracy, however. 
12.4  Conclusions 
This paper reviewed the history of bilateral trade negotiations between Tai- 
wan  and the United States. The question we posed  at the outset was: Does 
bilateralism enhance or jeopardize multilateralism? The Taiwan-U.S. case sug- 
gests that a bilateral approach to obtaining export restriction or market opening 
by removing nontariff barriers tends to be in conflict with the multilateral prin- 
ciple. VERs divert economic benefits to nonrestricted exporters at the expense 
of the importing country and possibly also at the expense of exporters subject 
to such restriction.  Bilateral negotiations for market opening under the threat 
of unilateral trade sanctions (Section 301 action) tend to encourage the practice 
of  trade preference. This practice, while rendering maximum benefits to U.S. 
industries, is detrimental to multilateralism. It  signals to the world that the 
United States is no longer interested in creating public goods for other mem- 
bers of the GATT and that those who are interested in entering Taiwan’s market 
ought to negotiate their own opportunities. The United States is more inclined 
to accept trade preference in areas where its domestic interests are concen- 
trated. In this connection, state power is employed by  oligopolistic firms to 
circumvent the competition process in gaining access to foreign markets. 
Even in the area of tariff negotiations, where any tariff reduction made by 
Taiwan is applied to other trading partners under the MFN principle, bilater- 
alism does not necessarily  enhance multilateralism.  Since tariff concessions 
are made selectively, with domestic business interests underlying the selection 
process, trade liberalization resulting from these negotiations is also biased. 
On the other hand,  we find that multilateral agreements  are used as “moral 
standards” by asymmetrically weak negotiators like Taiwan to defend their po- 
sitions. If the dominant negotiator adheres to multilateral principles, bilateral 
negotiations may  complement  multilateralism.  But  the temptation  to act in 
one’s  own  self-interest  seems  to  be  too  great  to  guarantee  such  a  happy 
outcome. 
In any event the prospect of Taiwan’s joining WTO in the near future may 
significantly change Taiwan’s bilateral relationship with the United States. First 
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ducers, will have to be abolished once Taiwan  is admitted to the WTO. To 
offset the loss from an elimination of trade preferences, U.S. negotiators have 
been particularly intransigent in demanding drastic tariff cuts in the related 
product  categories  during  the  bilateral  consultations  pertinent  to  Taiwan’s 
WTO admission. Second, losing the option of preferential trade arrangements 
reduces the opportunity set for compromise and may make future bilateral ne- 
gotiations  more  difficult  and  more  confrontational,  although  the  resultant 
agreements will be less distortive. Meanwhile, private interests lobbying the 
U.S. government to negotiate bilaterally for access to Taiwan’s market will have 
to give up their attempts to monopolize Taiwan’s market and leave the market 
access issue to multilateral organizations. Third, Taiwan will improve its bar- 
gaining power, and the legitimacy of its refusal to accept terms of agreement 
beyond the WTO rules will be strengthened. In cases involving split U.S.  inter- 
ests, Taiwan  may  even challenge US. demands presented  through bilateral 
channels by taking them to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, making 
the bilateral approach less effective for the United States in the future. In addi- 
tion, Taiwan may also make use of regional forums, such as APEC, to fortify 
its position against the United States in solving trade-related problems. 
Appendix 
Sources of  Data 
PUB: The share of public enterprises in agricultural production is calculated 
from the Report on Agriculture and Fishery Census, Taiwan-Fukien Dis- 
trict, the Republic of China (Taipei: ROC Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting, and Statistics [DGBAS], 1980, 1985, 1990); that in manu- 
factured output is from Kung ch’ang chiao cheng chi ying yun tiao ch’a 
pao kao (Survey of Factory Registrations and Operations; Taipei: ROC 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, various issues). 
WAGE: Wages of manufacturing workers are from Yearbook of Earning and 
Productivity Statistics, Taiwan Area, ROC (Taipei: DGBAS, 1993); those 
of agricultural workers are from Report on the Survey of  Family Income 
and Expenditure, Taiwan Province, ROC (Taipei: DGBAS, (1993). 
EMP: Employment size of manufacturing sector is from Yearbook of Earning 
and Productivity Statistics,  Taiwan Area, ROC (Taipei: DGBAS,  1993); 
employment size of agricultural sector is from Agricultural  Production 
Statistics Abstract, Taiwan District, ROC (Taipei: ROC Council of Agri- 
culture, 1993). 
TB: Average nominal tariffs are based on 1986 levels and calculated from Cus- 
toms Import Tariffs and Classijication of Import and Export Commodities 
of the Republic of  China (Taipei: ROC Ministry of Finance, 1986). 365  Bilateral Negotiations and Multilateral Trade 
NTB: Nontariff barrier index is also based on 1986 levels. NTB is a weighted 
index of  five forms of trade barriers: prohibition and control, producer- 
only import restriction, public-enterprise-only import restriction, sources- 
of-import restriction, and administrative licensing control. For details of 
the calculation, see Chen and Hou (1993). 
CR4: Four-firm concentration ratio  is calculated from  1986 Industrial  and 
Commercial Census (databank; Taipei: DGBAS, 1986). 
UTB: U.S. concessions in nominal tariffs in the Tokyo Round are from Alan 
Deardorff and Robert Stem, “The Effect of Tokyo Round on the Structure 
of Protection,” in The Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Pol- 
icy, ed. Robert Baldwin and Anne Krueger (Chicago: University of Chi- 
cago Press, 1984). 
UERP: Same as UTB. 
UCR4: Four-firm concentration ratios are from 1987  Census of Manufactures 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1987). 
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Comment  sang-woo Nam 
Korea is no different from Taiwan in its vulnerability to bilateral trade pressure 
from the United States. As the proverb says, “Misery loves company.” We have 
full sympathy with Taiwan. During 1978-88,  eight countervailing duty cases 
were filed against Korea by  U.S. industries, 31 antidumping cases, and  15 
cases of import relief on the part of the United States against Korean products. 
My  comments focus on the analytical part of  Chen and Liu’s  paper: the 
political economic analysis of tariff concessions. Presented in table 12.5 is an 
equation of U.S. demand for concessions, in which the only significant U.S.- 
related variable revealed is comparative advantage. In Taiwan, U.S. market 
share for import items targeted for concession is said to have increased from 
31.6 percent in 1977 to 45 percent in  1990. Here, what I want to point out is 
that causality runs both ways between comparative advantage and demand for 
concessions: that is, the more concessions the United States obtains, the faster 
its market share rises. 
The authors tried the industrial concentration ratio of  the United States to 
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see whether highly concentrated industries are better organized for pressuring 
the government. It would also be interesting to see whether Taiwanese indus- 
tries with high concentration ratios would be effective at resisting U.S. requests 
for concessions. The motivation of concentrated industries to pursue lobbying 
efforts may be stronger for the country giving concessions than for the country 
requesting them. This is so because the Taiwanese market is likely to be small 
for US.  firms, and not all of them may actually benefit from concessions be- 
cause of competition among them, while all Taiwanese firms are affected. 
The success rate for the United States is reported to be 73 percent, obtaining 
1,314 concessions out of  1,807 requests. The success rate by industry would 
be valuable information for the purpose of analyzing how important political 
economic considerations were on the part of Taiwan. 
Finally, the sample periods for the two equations presented in table 12.5 are 
not the same. If an important missing variable specific to a particular period is 
closely associated with an explanatory variable, estimated coefficients may not 
be reliable. In Taiwan, where the structure of comparative advantage and the 
industrial structure have changed rapidly, this seems very possible. Even in the 
case where a lack of  data is the problem, the second equation (final conces- 
sions) could be estimated for the same sample period as the first equation. This 
would make us more comfortable with comparing the estimated coefficients 
between the two equations. 
Comment  Hank Lim 
This paper provides a very interesting and useful empirical study of the rela- 
tionship of bilateral negotiations between the United States and Taiwan to the 
multilateral trade regime. The purpose of  this study is to reveal whether the 
empirical results of bilateral negotiations dominated by the United States con- 
form to the established principle of multilateralism. 
It is generally believed that a bilateral approach to world trade issues and 
problems is inferior to a multilateral approach. Theoretically,  a bilateral ap- 
proach  may  not even produce a second-best solution. The economic cost of 
voluntary export restraints and the problems associated with safeguard mea- 
sures have been widely discussed in the economic literature. In comparison, 
the bilateral approach to market opening has not been analyzed in great detail. 
This empirical study  specifically  attempts to examine the bilateral trade ar- 
rangements between the United States and Taiwan on market access and tariff 
and  nontariff  reductions  under  the  framework  of  asymmetrical  bargaining 
power between the two trade partners. 
Another interesting aspect of this study involves the incorporation of a polit- 
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ical economy model to explain the results of bilateral negotiations between the 
two  economies  on tariff  concessions.  This was  done  through  a regression 
model to determine which factors were important in influencing the outcome 
of negotiations. The statistical results were significant and functionally corre- 
lated  as expected,  except for the employment  variable  for the  Taiwan-side 
equation. This variable does, however, have a correct negative sign in the final 
concessions  equation,  suggesting  that  Taiwan’s  negotiators  were  somewhat 
concerned about industries with large numbers of employees. In the U.S.-side 
equation the results were equally significant and correlated. 
The statistical results of this study are consistent with Krueger’s earlier study 
on bilateral trade negotiations  between  the United  States and  South Korea 
(Krueger 1993). The basic conclusion of both studies confirms the hypothesis 
that bilateral trade negotiations between unequal partners tend to depart from 
the multilateral principle. In the case of Taiwan, there was a certain element of 
peculiarity in the sense that the Taiwanese government seemed to prefer bilat- 
eral arrangements with the United States for market opening rather than full- 
scale trade liberalization under the multilateral principle. This is due to the fact 
that Taiwan’s domestic market is dominated by large conglomerates and state- 
owned enterprises, and Taiwan is not a member of the GATT. 
The Taiwan-U.S. bilateral case as revealed in this study suggests that a bilat- 
eral approach to obtaining export restrictions or market opening tends to be in 
conflict with the multilateral principle. Furthermore, bilateral negotiations for 
market opening under the threat of unilateral trade sanctions tend to encourage 
the practice of trade preference. This practice, while rendering maximum bene- 
fits to U.S. industries, is detrimental to global multilateralism. 
The empirical evidence in this study also confirms the theoretical hypothesis 
that the United States is particularly inclined to accept trade preference in areas 
where its domestic interests are concentrated. 
There are, however, four points that require further clarification. They are 
as follows: 
1. On wages, the paper needs to explain more fully how to reconcile the 
conflicting  objectives  of  enhancing  employment  and  protecting  high-wage 
newly emerging industries. The regression model on the Taiwan side seems to 
show that Taiwanese officials were more concerned with protecting high-wage 
newly emerging industries. 
2.  On employment, the empirical results show that this explanatory variable 
is not important to Taiwanese policymakers. The paper should indicate the un- 
derlying structural and expedient factors behind this departure from the con- 
ventional theory. 
3.  On the assertion that existing tariff and nontariff barriers are not as im- 
portant to the final outcome of negotiation, could it be that tariff and nontariff 
barriers in Taiwan are basically used to protect Taiwan’s industries from coun- 
tries other than the United States? 
4.  On the assumption that different international trade policies adopted by 369  Bilateral Negotiations and Multilateral Trade 
different  U.S.  administrations  seem to have had no impact on the  demand 
equation of the U.S. regression model, is this realistic? 
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